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Computing is too important to be left to men.
—Karen Spärck JonesCan a machine have toothache?
There are some questions we should never put to Siri and other talking 
chatbots, or we will come away feeling underwhelmed by the machine’s
much-touted intelligence. This could be one of them. The machine will 
not understand the question—at least, not in the foreseeable future—al-
though humans would not fare much better trying to make sense of it ei-
ther. The question bears the hallmarks of philosophical surrealism that
identify the author as Ludwig Wittgenstein.1 It is as if the philosopher had 
anticipated Alan Turing’s classic provocation “Can machines think?” and
decided to parody him.2
Unlike the Turing question, Wittgenstein’s parody avant la lettre re-
quires no reply, has elicited none, and leads only to further questions:
What is the point of his parody? Is it to convey his misgivings about the 
claims of machine cognition? If that were true, why single out “tooth-
ache”—something machines can do happily without—when he could have 
evoked nobler human aptitudes as do most anthropocentric critics whenMy residency at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton in 2018–2019 helped shape the 
original idea for this essay. I thank the School of Historical Studies, in particular, for their 
generous support and facilitation of many cross-disciplinary conversations at IAS that led to 
my new research.
1. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Preliminary Studies for the “Philosophical Investigations”: Gener-
ally Known as The Blue and Brown Books (New York, 1969), p. 16; hereafter abbreviated PS.
2. Alan Turing, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” in Turing et al., The Essential Tu-
ring: Seminal Writings in Computing, Logic, Philosophy, Artificial Intelligence, and Artificial Life, 
plus the Secrets of Enigma, ed. B. Jack Copeland (New York, 2004), p. 441.
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426 Lydia H. Liu / Wittgenstein in the Machinethey engage AI practitioners in contentious debates. Some of us might be
tempted to read in Wittgenstein’s question an endorsement of affect, emo-
tion, and noncognitive behavior, holding onto the last preserve of human/
animal identities in the face of the imminent encroachment of AI affective sim-
ulations. Unfortunately, such a straight-faced reading would stretch the sense
of toothache beyond the word itself until we lose the parody altogether.
When Wittgenstein dictated his lectures in 1933–1934 to his students at
the University of Cambridge, where the question first came up, machine
cognition and machine affect seemed rather remote from his mind. The
sentence “Could a machine think?” struck him as flawed because it exem-
plified what he called the misused analogy by human speakers (PS, p. 16).
To allow the analogy to take hold is to grant as much sense to the parodic
sentence “Can a machine have toothache?” as it is to the proposition of a
thinking machine (PS, p. 16). Wittgenstein goes on to say: “The trouble is
rather that the sentence, ‘A machine thinks (perceives, wishes)’: seems some-
how nonsensical. It is as though we had asked ‘Has the number 3 a col-
our?’” (PS, p. 47). Which is to say that, prior to advancing a possible argu-
ment against the intellectual claims of the computing machine, one must
interrogate and critique the sense of the original proposition first, and this
is where his parody comes in.3
In a surprising turn of events, that critique anticipated Wittgenstein’s
subsequent encounter and arguments with Turing in 1939 when the latter
showed up in his class. Their open confrontation has prompted Stuart
Shanker to speculate that “the Turing Test represents Turing’s opposition
to Wittgenstein’s critique, using a Wittgenstein-like argument.”4 Specula-
tions aside, it is reasonable to observe in retrospect that the fateful encoun-
ter between Wittgenstein and Turing in 1939 was a mere prelude to the3. In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein repeats the point and considers what pertains
between saying and thinking when we project the word think elsewhere, to dolls, ghosts, and
machines. This is followed by another parody: “The chair is thinking to itself . . .” (Wittgen-
stein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker, and Joachim
Schulte [Malden, Mass., 2009], p. 121e).
4. Stuart Shanker, Wittgenstein’s Remarks on the Foundations of AI (New York, 1998), p. 2.
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stand in opposition to the exaggerated claims of AI inventions believe that
they have found a powerful ally in Wittgenstein. Hubert Dreyfus, for exam-
ple, has repeatedly cautioned us about what the computer cannot do, citing
human “fringe consciousness,” “ambiguity tolerance,” and so on, and he
draws on Wittgenstein to shore up the position.6
It seems unthinkable, therefore, that Wittgenstein or the philosophy his
name stands for has anything to do with the computing machine itself,
much less with the AI machine. But this is exactly what I intend to demon-
strate inmy essay, and I am going to presentmy evidence by calling attention
to a parallel postwar development surrounding Wittgenstein that is just as
important as the familiar critical stance. This alternative deep history began
to emerge as I was examining a counterintuitive situation at the initial stage
of my research, namely, Why did Wittgenstein’s profound doubts and open
disagreements with Turing fail to deter leading AI precursors and practi-
tioners from claiming him as one of their own?
The news of AI researchers’ longtime engagement with Wittgenstein has
been slow to arrive. The truth is that Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language
is so closely bound up with the semantic networks of the computer from
the mid-1950s down to the present that we can no longer turn a blind eye to
its embodiment in the AI machine. But what does it mean for AI practitioners
to engage withWittgenstein? Let me illustrate it by giving you a contemporary
example. John F. Sowa, a prominent AI scientist who invented conceptual
graphs for databases in the 1970s, has attributed the distinction he introduces
between lexical structure and conceptual structure toWittgenstein, who taught
him that “the ambiguities and complexities of language result from its use in
novel situations with novel ways of relating words to objects” and, therefore,
“the ultimate source of ambiguity is not the structure of language, but the
complexity and variability of the world itself.”7We need not take Sowa’s inter-
pretation as a faithful representation of Wittgenstein’s own ideas to heed the
fact that the computer scientist is grappling with the philosophical implica-
tions of his work in Wittgensteinian terms as he tries to resolve the technical
difficulties of word and concept entanglement in the computer—that is, units,
levels, and frames of knowledge representation. The larger implication of Sowa’s
theory is not something that I can elaborate on in my article. What I want
to emphasize is that his machine is Wittgensteinian in the sense that the5. See Hubert Dreyfus’s defense of Wittgenstein against Turing in Hubert L. Dreyfus, What
Computers Can’t Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason (New York, 1972), pp. 104–05.
6. Ibid., pp. 100, 107.
7. John F. Sowa, “Lexical Structures and Conceptual Structures,” in Semantics and the Lexi-
con, ed. James Pustejovsky (Boston, 1993), p. 249.
428 Lydia H. Liu / Wittgenstein in the Machineconceptual graphs describe the meaning of data in accordance to the user’s
view even though these are also associated with procedures that access the data
according to the machine’s view.8 That is to say, the multiple human uses of
language determine the multiplicity of meanings that the conceptual graphs
must accommodate in the machine. Sowa is not alone nor the first in this
endeavor.
Which brings me to British AI scientist Yorick Wilks, who has always
insisted that AI concerns were present in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy.9
What Wilks seems to be claiming goes deeper and further than the instru-
mental application of Wittgenstein’s ideas to the computer as some are in-
clined to regard Sowa’s research. Wilks and Sowa both work in the key
subfields of AI research, notably Natural Language Processing (NLP, for-
merly known as Computational Linguistics), Machine Translation (MT),
and Information Retrieval (IR). Researchers in these fields find themselves
in the unenviable situation of having to grapple with the challenges of or-
dinary language and confront its unique difficulties and infinite perplexities.
Having struggled with the same difficulties, Wittgenstein would have been in
a perfect position to dialogue with the newcomers. One of the world’s pio-
neering teams of AI researchers that I discuss below has not hesitated to trace
the philosophical roots of their work to Wittgenstein.
I wonder sometimes if the AI scientist’s Wittgenstein is the same thinker
as the philosopher’s Wittgenstein. Dreyfus would almost certainly say no,
whereas Sowa, Wilks, and others would probably say yes. There is no doubt
that Wittgenstein’s philosophy can be open to all sorts of interpretations—
after all, the philosopher repudiated his own Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
in later life—and he has been read differently by linguists, philosophers, and
others. Still, one must account for the fact that his work has engaged the at-
tention of AI researchers not only in the 1970s down to the present but also
from the beginnings of computational research. In particular, Wittgenstein
inspired a group of researchers called Cambridge Language Research Unit
(CLRU) in Britain to launch one of the first programs in machine transla-
tion, information retrieval, mechanical abstracting, and so on in the 1950s,
all of which are now claimed for AI and cognitive science.
It is in the philosophy of CLRU founder Margaret Masterman (1910–
1986) that we will find our first clue as to how Wittgenstein or his later
philosophy got into the AI machine, both literally and metaphorically. Like8. See Sowa, “Conceptual Graphs for a Data Base Interface,” IBM Journal of Research and
Development 20 (July 1976): 336–57.
9. See Yorick Wilks, “Philosophy of Language,” in Computational Semantics: An Introduction
to Artificial Intelligence and Natural Language Comprehension, ed. Eugene Charniak and Wilks
(New York, 1981), pp. 205–33.
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as suggested by the epigram from eminent AI scientist Karen Spärck Jones:
“Computing is too important to be left to men.”10 The story of a woman phi-
losopher of AI has been waiting to be told, as long as one does not to suppress
women on purpose or subconsciously. It is a deeply human story about how
the pioneers in AI research struggled tomake sense of the infinitely entangled
web of words and concepts in the languagemachine. The reciprocal illumina-
tion of humans and machines in the course of that struggle should give us
some inkling of what is possible in the philosophy of ordinary language. One
glimmer of hope comes from the direction of how—not whether—Western
philosophy will move beyond its self-imposed myopia and open up to other
possibilities; I mean genuine possibilities beyond the ethnocentric imagina-
tion of analytic philosophy or continental philosophy that has heretofore
dominated our conception of language, logic, writing, and media technology.
Hence, the urgency and importance of learning from post-Wittgensteinian
philosophy and carrying its work forward.
The Woman Philosopher Who Pioneered the AI Machine
The posthumous publication of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations
(1953) and The Blue and Brown Books (1958) coincided with the emergence of
cybernetics and communication technologies that sought to redefine the
terms of philosophical inquiries about language, meaning, and the mind. It
was a timewhenNoamChomskywas developing his theory of syntactic struc-
ture and transformational generative grammar at MIT, and, at the same time,
Margaret Masterman was building her thesaurus model and semantic algo-
rithms with the young researchers that she recruited to CLRU in Cambridge,
UK.Unlike Chomsky,Masterman’s point of departure was not syntactic rules
but semantic nets or networks ofwords or semantic patterns that form the basis
of the machine representation of knowledge and its processing of natural lan-
guage. In the history of AI research, it is well known that her work was closely
related to the development of the chunks, frames, scripts, and schemata of AI
systems and inspired Wilks’s pathbreaking theory of preference semantics.
Speaking ofMasterman’s contributions tomachine translation,Wilks himself
notes that her innovation in the 1950s contains “the germ of what later was to
be called EBMT or example-based translation . . . , which is now perhaps the
most productive current approach to MT world-wide.”11 In hindsight—like10. Quoted in Nellie Bowles, “Overlooked No More: Karen Sparck Jones, Who Established
the Basis for Search Engines,” New York Times, 2 Jan. 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/01/02/obitu
aries/karen-sparck-jones-overlooked.html?searchResultPosition=1
11. Wilks, commentary to Margaret Masterman, “Semantic Algorithms,” in Language, Cohe-
sion and Form, ed. Wilks (New York, 2005), p. 279; hereafter abbreviated “S.”
430 Lydia H. Liu / Wittgenstein in the Machinethe advances in statistical models of MT and the decline of syntax analysis
since the 1990s—her work proved extraordinarily prescient. Her thesaurus
method and semantic nets, in particular, putMastermanmany decades ahead
of her time.
The profound and irreconcilable chasm between Masterman’s model of
language and that of Chomsky’s is something she insisted upon throughout
the 1950s–1960s, and she never missed an opportunity to reiterate their phil-
osophical differences. Her main objection to the prevailing theory of syn-
tactic structure is that Chomsky’s syntactic rules are modeled on logical
calculus, not on natural languages that are flexible, rich, ambiguous, meta-
phorical, and infinitely extensible. Like other rules derived from the calcu-
lus, syntactic rules subtract their linguistic facts “from that very superficial
and highly redundant part of language that children, aphasics, people in a
hurry, and colloquial speakers always, quite rightly, drop” (“S,” p. 266).Mas-
terman contends that the ambiguities and indeterminate meanings in natu-
ral languages are not a defect to be overcome by substituting a purified lan-
guage of logical calculus. On the contrary, the key to understanding natural
language and, consequently, its adequate coding on the computer, must be
sought in semantic networks that alone are capable of handling the multi-
plicity and indeterminacy of word meanings. What this means is that one
must focus on data in actual language use, not on what theMT linguists were
practicing at that time: sentence parsing.
If Masterman’s defense of ordinary language on the MT machine bears
uncanny resemblance to Wittgenstein’s ideas, it need not surprise us, as
there had been an intellectual bond between them, one that had originated
in the interwar years when she first encountered him in a class at the Uni-
versity of Cambridge. That bond underwent an unexpected transformation
to evolve into what I term post-Wittgensteinian philosophy after World
War II. Masterman vigorously pursued her philosophical work in both
the traditional venues of philosophy—debates, seminars, workshops, jour-
nals, and conference proceedings—and in its algorithmic embodiment by
the computing machine. It cannot be fortuitous that the woman who led
one of the world’s leading research centers on computation research to
lay the foundation of essential AI technologies was a philosopher, not a com-
puter scientist.
Who was Margaret Masterman?
Not much biographical information is available to give us the full life
story of this extraordinary woman except what we can glean from an ac-
count by Wilks.12 There are also some scattered sketches and summaries12. See Wilks, “Margaret Masterman,” in Early Years in Machine Translation: Memoirs and
Biographies of Pioneers, ed. W. John Hutchins (Philadelphia, 2000), pp. 279–97.
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Anthony Appiah. In his reminiscences about the mid-1970s, Appiah recounts
how he wandered into Masterman’s circle as a college student. He writes:
My main intellectual mentor at Cambridge wasn’t a person: it was a
commune. Its members called themselves the Epiphany Philosophers,
or E.P.’s. The central figures Dorothy Emmet, Margaret Masterman
and Masterman’s husband, Richard Braithwaite lived together in a
large house, round the corner from a ramshackle shed they also
owned, home to the Cambridge Language Research Unit, or
C.L.R.U., which Masterman ran. What they had in common was not
just philosophy and a taste for abbreviations. . . . The C.L.R.U. was
past its prime, though through its portals had passed some of the
people, like Roger Needham and Karen Spärck Jones, who helped lay
the intellectual foundations of modern computing.
The E.P.’s were brilliant, argumentative, generous and, often, quite
dotty. . . . It was the E.P.’s who introduced me to the possibility of
philosophy, not just as an academic subject but as a way of life. Phi-
losophy for them was mixed up with friendship and brisk walks in
the Norfolk countryside and drinking cheap (and even, occasionally,
expensive) wine; it required openness to physics, linguistics, theology,
parapsychology. Nothing human or otherwise was alien to them. For
a 19-year-old, it was completely exhilarating.13
This charming vignette of a small but open intellectual community center-
ing around the three philosophers communicates a tangible sense of how
members of CLRU lived and worked together twenty years after its found-
ing. Roger Needham (1935–2003) and Spärck Jones (1935–2007) had been
Masterman’s longtime collaborators at CLRU.14 In his study of William
Empson in light of vector semantics, Michael Gavin indicates that, together
with Spärck Jones, “Masterman developed the first computer-based thesau-
rus, drawn from Roget’s, for modeling word meaning; words, Masterman
believed, distributed meaning through a corpus in a lattice-shaped net-
work.”15 This is true, and it remains to be seen how much of Masterman’s
philosophical work went into the computer modeling of word meanings.13. Kwame Anthony Appiah, “The Epiphany Philosophers,” New York Times Magazine,
19 Sept. 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/magazine/21jolley-side.html?searchResultPosition=1
14. The core members of CLRU researchers were not more than ten people. Three of its
alumni Martin Kay, Spärck Jones, and Wilks would receive the Annual Lifetime Achievement
Awards from the Association for Computational Linguistics in the US.
15. Michael Gavin, “Vector Semantics, William Empson, and the Study of Ambiguity,” Crit-
ical Inquiry 44 (Summer 2018): 653.
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cognitive science, shares with us another rare glimpse of Masterman when
CLRU first formed in the early 1950s. Like Appiah, albeit twenty years ear-
lier, Boden says that she had adopted Masterman as her mentor and insisted
on being taught by this original and somewhat eccentric thinker despite op-
position from her director of studies. In the preface to Mind as Machine: A
History of Cognitive Science, Boden offers a detailed description of CLRU when
the group began meeting informally in 1954:
Masterman’s group was doing research on what’s now called Natural
Language Processing, or NLP. They ranged widely over topics later
claimed for AI and cognitive science. These included machine transla-
tion, the representation of knowledge for information retrieval, and
the nature and process of classification. Although their theory of clas-
sification was never described in print as computational “learning”, it
dealt with issues later so described by AI.
Masterman was one of the first people in the world to attempt
machine translation, and she made semantics, not syntax, the driving
force. She was deeply influenced by certain aspects of Ludwig
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of language. Despite her gender—
Wittgenstein was notorious for his mysogyny—she’d been one of his
favourite students, to whom he’d dictated the lectures later known as
The Blue Book.16
This last detail caught my eye. Was Masterman Wittgenstein’s favorite stu-
dent? Ray Monk, a biographer of Wittgenstein, appears to confirm the ob-
servation. He relates how Masterman and another female student, Alice
Ambrose, joined a small group of students Wittgenstein handpicked to at-
tend his course and permitted to take lecture notes. The duplicated set of
the notes his students put together was subsequently bound in blue paper
covers, hence the title for The Blue Book.17
Wittgenstein’s reputation as a misogynist did not discourage female stu-
dents from attending his courses, nor did he attempt to exclude them if they
lived up to his expectation of honorary males.18 Although we don’t have
Masterman’s firsthand account of the class dynamic, Ambrose provided a16. Margaret A. Boden, Mind as Machine: A History of Cognitive Science, 2 vols. (New York,
2006), 1:xii–xiii.
17. See Ray Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (New York, 1990), p. 336.
18. Wittgenstein once said to Elizabeth Anscombe (1919–2001): “Thank God we’ve got rid
of the women!” and was delighted that no (other) female students were in attendance (quoted
in ibid., p. 498). Anscombe became one of his closest friends and an editor of his posthumous
publications.
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ter sought her story to prepare an article for The Journal of Philosophy. I will
quote a lengthy excerpt of Ambrose’s recollection—not mentioned in
Monk’s biography for some reason—as it appears in the Bouwsma piece, be-
cause it is the sole surviving description of Masterman’s interaction with
Wittgenstein in that class:
Wittgenstein was listed in the Cambridge Reporter as giving two courses
of lectures in 1933–34, one being called “Philosophy for Mathemati-
cians.” To this, as I remember, 30 or 40 people turned up, which dis-
tressed him. After three or four weeks of lecturing he turned up at lec-
ture and told the class he couldn’t continue to lecture. I remember the
occasion and remember how amazed I was that an announced course of
lectures could be abandoned in this way. Of the people in that class he
chose five of the rest of us to dictate The Blue Book to: H. M. S. Coxeter
and R. L. Goodstein, mathematicians, also Francis Skinner (who might
have been on a Trinity Grant to do math. though he actually left off do-
ing math. in order to devote himself to Wittgenstein’s work), Margaret
Masterman Braithwaite and myself. About a month later, I see by a ref-
erence to my diary that the five of us had increased to seven, and I know
one of them was Mrs. Helen Knight but for the life of me I can’t re-
member the other one. Wittgenstein quarreled with Coxeter because
Coxeter quite innocently ran off on a mimeograph the material of
the first term’s dictation and discussion. So Coxeter didn’t continue in
the second term. Mrs. Braithwaite also dropped out during the year in the
third term. I’ve forgotten what the unpleasantness was in her case. She and
I took down discussion that he wasn’t including in The Blue Book and we
called this The Yellow Book. He once flew at her for doing so, but as he was
also distressed when something he thought good was not taken down be-
cause he wasn’t dictating—and she pointed this out to him at the time—
this practice on our part was allowed to continue. I believe I continued
with it after she left.19
What seems fascinating about Wittgenstein’s interaction with his students
is not so much his unexpected abandonment of the lecture course as the
moments of tension and open confrontation Ambrose has managed to
communicate in her letter. Masterman began as one of the teacher’s favor-
ite students, but the relationship deteriorated and nearly got out of control.
If Masterman dropped out in the third term, was she thrown out like19. Quoted in O. K. Bouwsma, “The Blue Book,” The Journal of Philosophy 58 (Mar. 1961):
141; my emphasis.
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to push the speculation.
What we do know is that the pedagogical scene in Wittgenstein’s class-
room—not altogether a successful one—was but a starting point forMaster-
man, who continued to engage with his philosophical thinking and ended
upmaking an important contribution to ordinary language philosophy after
WorldWar II. She is not unacknowledged as the first researcher to introduce
Wittgenstein to AI studies, but this recognition says nothing about the orig-
inality of her own philosophical work. It is time that we read Masterman
closely and carefully to understand how she engages with Wittgenstein’s
thought in the computing machine and where she departs from him. In a
nutshell, we must give her the kind of attention that all formidable philos-
ophers deserve.
Drop the Logos
“What is the meaning of a word?” This opening question in The Blue
Book is one of many innocuous but difficult issues that Wittgenstein had
thrown at Masterman and her fellow students who were tasked with note-
taking (PS, p. 1). It forces an enduring puzzle upon their attention because
the entanglement of word and concept has been a main source of difficulty
to philosophers, linguists, translators, and historians. Where does the word
end and the concept begin? Is the distinction between word and concept a
necessary distinction as Ferdinand de Saussure had insisted? Even if we
disregard their distinction in ordinary language use, we still find ourselves
wondering what the meaning of a word is and how we are to determine its
semantic boundaries.
Having posed his opening question, Wittgenstein goes on to say that
when we cannot point to anything in reply to questions like this and feel that
we must point to something, we run up against “one of the great sources of
philosophical bewilderment: a substantive makes us look for a thing that
corresponds to it” (PS, p. 1). Saussure, who had developed a theory of semi-
ology in his teachings at the University of Geneva, similarly refuted the cor-
respondence theory of thing and name.20 He contended that “the linguistic
sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept and a sound-image.”21
And what is a concept? Is it free from the entanglement attending upon the
word in the linguistic sign? Saussure did not pursue such questions—whereas20. Saussure and Wittgenstein never crossed each other’s academic paths in spite of their
shared interest. See Roy Harris, Language, Saussure and Wittgenstein: How to Play Games with
Words (New York, 1990).
21. Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. Wade Baskin, ed. Perry
Meisel and Haun Saussy (New York, 2011), p. 66.
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further, adding: “We are unable clearly to circumscribe the concepts we use;
not because we don’t know their real definition, but because there is no real
‘definition’ to them” (PS, p. 25). Henceforward, starting from his lectures in
The Blue Book, Wittgenstein begins to develop one of his best-known argu-
ments in the discussion of language games: themeaning of a word (or phrase)
is not a mental state or “a mental accompaniment to the expression” but “the
use wemake of it” (PS, p. 65). He argues that there is no such a thing as private
language because the meaning of a word happens in the context of language
use and will always change depending upon the next context in which the
word is used. Wittgenstein would hammer this out in greater detail in The
Brown Book, Philosophical Investigations,OnCertainty, and his other remarks.
Within one year of the publication of Philosophical Investigations, Master-
man posed her own question “What is a word?” in an article called “Words,”
in which she calls for a new departure in ordinary language philosophy by in-
terrogating the identity ofword itself.22The deliberate shift from “meaning” to
“word” in the wake ofWittgenstein’s question allows her to reopen one of the
seemingly indisputable linguistic facts to philosophical inquiry. Her question
does not require a new definition of word any more than does Wittgenstein’s
earlier question requires a better definition of the “meaning of a word.” It cen-
ters, instead, on the undecidability of the identity of word in language use.
Take one of the examples she introduces into the discussion. How do we
know that ward (“a person or minor under protection”), ward (“room in a
hospital”), andward (“to parry” in fencing), andmany other usages in English
are one and the same word with different shades of meaning rather than, say,
different words that happen to share the material signWARD with respect to
phonemes (homophones) and spelling? TheOxford English Dictionary (OED)
has simplified the matter by classifying the multiple uses of ward—as verb,
noun, adjective suffix, adverb suffix, proper name—under one entry, essen-
tially treating them as a single word under the rule of polysemy.23This solution
is convenient but proves incapable of resolving the undecidability of word as
a philosophical conundrum.
That conundrum is by no means an idle issue. Masterman’s research
group at CLRU learned it the hard way within a couple of years when they
embarked on the computational research on machine translation and in-
formation retrieval. The undecidability of word in either determination—a
single word with multiple senses or multiple words unified by a single sign—
became an endless source of frustration and challenge for them, trumping all22. Masterman, “Words,” in Language, Cohesion and Form, p. 21; hereafter abbreviated “W.”
23. Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “ward.”
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the researchers ran into technical difficulties while mining data from pedes-
trian language use or when they found themselves overwhelmed by the
ubiquity of word-concept entanglement in the machine. I take up the tech-
nical issues and solutions in the last section.
If the conundrum of word and concept is more of a philosophical prob-
lem than it is linguistic, lexical, or technical, should we look to philosophers
for a good answer? Masterman, however, remains skeptical of the postwar
generation of philosophers, surmising that these men wouldmost likely give
one of the three answers. The first is that everybody knows what a word is;
the second is that nobody knows what a word is; and the third or the typical
reaction from logicians and analytical philosophers is that “it doesn’t matter
anyway what a word is, since the statement is what matters, not the word”
(“W,” p. 31). Masterman tries to show why this argument is deeply flawed.
She points out that “the logical importance of finding out what we think
about words—and the logical importance of examining and distinguishing
usages in context—turns out to lie in the fact that our conception of a ‘state-
ment’ (and, a fortiori, of logically possible forms of connection between
‘statements’) is fundamentally affected by our logical conception of a ‘word’”
(“W,” p. 38). Herein lies the philosophical impasse: The logical conception of
word—in contrast to the common dictionary definition of word with its tau-
tologies—is responsible not only for the possibility of a statement but also for
the word-concept entanglement that the logical statement is expected to clar-
ify or undo.
Therefore, the critique of the logical conception of word constitutes the first
step toward a post-Wittgensteinian philosophy of language. “In entering this
new universe of discourse,”Masterman proposes, “the logician has to prepare
himself for two successive and contrary shocks.” The first is the shock of find-
ing a “very great deal of indeterminacy everywhere” (Wittgensteinian argu-
ment), and, after one has faced the first shock, the second is the shock of finding
“what unforeseen new vistas open out, and what a lot can be done,”which fore-
shadows the post-Wittgensteinian machine she would be building at CLRU. In
her judgment, philosophers of ordinary language who take an interest in for-
mal logic havemade “the mistake of putting their positive and negative results
much too much at the service of the old logical approach, in order, apparently,
to try and sophisticate it.” This attempt is fruitless. What we need is “a new
sensitiveness to ordinary language” and “a fundamentally new approach to
the problem of what logic is” (“W,” pp. 36 n 3, 36–37 n 3, 37 n 3).
Is there anything new about Masterman’s attack on the old logical ap-
proach? One of her objectives is to overcome what Jacques Derrida later
termedWestern logocentrism. In that sense, her workmay be said to anticipate
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ment I am trying to make here. Rather, I want to stress the essential differ-
ences: For Masterman, to overcome Western logocentrism means opening
up the ideographic imagination beyond what is possible by the measure of
alphabetical writing. This is important, as it follows that the scientist’s and
philosopher’s reliance on conceptual categories derived from alphabetical
writing in their commitment to logical precision and systematization as well
as their deconstruction must likewise be subjected to post-Wittgensteinian
critique. This philosophical ambition is amply reflected not only in Master-
man’s published essays from the early 1950s onward but is implemented,
methodically and painstakingly, in her innovations of MT and IR technol-
ogies in the subsequent decades. Her engagement with philosophy and, in
particular, with Wittgenstein’s later philosophy remains inseparable from
the work of CLRU on computer algorithms. For this reason, we are fully
justified to describe Masterman’s work as doing philosophy in the machine,
literally speaking. What she did was turn the cognitive limitations of the
computer—that is, the challenges involved in the programming of the
MT machine to distinguish amongst ward, ward, and ward as different words
or as different senses of one word—into a distinct advantage to achieve greater
philosophical clarity about the entanglement of word and concept in human
languages.
To that end, Masterman seizes upon the logical conception of word as her
main target in the critique of Western logocentrism. To push the critique be-
yond what is possible by the measure of alphabetical writing, she takes the bold,
preliminary step of opening up the ideographic imagination for future philos-
ophy. This is already present in an earlier albeit shorter piece she had written
and presented at the International Congress of Philosophy in Brussels on
20–26 August 1953 where she began to elaborate a “pictorial principle” that
opposed the ideographic conception of language to logocentrism. In her pa-
per “The Pictorial Principle in Language,” Masterman accuses formal logi-
cians—known as analytical philosophers in the US—of reducing “thought”
to the manipulation of logical units called statements. Their procedure runs
like this: Statements are at their most statement like when they are deducible
from other statements; and statements are at their most elegant when they
are systematized. She goes on to observe:
Now, though, when we see the advantages which the successive estab-
lishment of precision, deductive connection and systematisation have
produced in science after science, we feel that, in a sense, the logi-
cians are right in their estimate of “what thinking really is”, the fact
remains that when we ourselves think most deeply, we nearly always
438 Lydia H. Liu / Wittgenstein in the Machinethrow the whole logical machinery over. At such times we “doodle”, we
compare, we “match”; we write down isolated words, we draw pictures on
the edge of the paper, we make models.24
In the italicized quote, the author cites seemingly random acts as examples of
pictorial thinking: doodling, comparing, matching (patterns), scribbling,
drawing pictures, and so on. These acts are not as random as they first appear
and would prove integral and indispensable to the thesaurus methodMaster-
man would develop for machine translation at CLRU. Almost by necessity,
she and her group resorted to scribbling, doodling, matching, and hand-
drawn diagrams and pictures because the computer of the mid-1950s was ru-
dimentary, and much of their early work had to be done first by hand and
then performed on Hollerith punched-card machines. The first digital com-
puter did not arrive in the office of CLRUuntil 1963 or 1964, and it was a prim-
itive ICT1202 with only 4K storage and no backup.25
More fundamental than the technological handicap is the philosophical
question of what constitutes pictorial thinking. Masterman dismisses the no-
tion that pictorial thinking has anything to do with the primitive vestigial
habit or that it is about pictorial forms of representation. She relates it, in-
stead, toWittgenstein’s idea of the logic of representation in his earlier study of
language inTractatus Logico-Philosophicus. To carry that work forward,Master-
man proposes a series of methodological interventions:
The first is that we must develop exact analytic procedures, in order
to discover what Wittgenstein, speaking more literally than he knew,
called “the logic of representation”. The second is that the proper
field in which to attack this problem is not that of the psychological
study of images or the ethnological study of sign-stimuli, nor that of
the philosophy or psychology of visual artistic creation, but that pro-
vided by the well-documented existence of an actual language founded
upon what I shall call “the picture principle”; that is, by investigating
the logical forms in Classical Chinese. [“PP,” pp. 139–40]
This is an unorthodox proposition, one that few have contemplated or
thought worthwhile except for a handful ofmathematicians and philosophers
who urged a similar investigation, including Ernst Mach, Alfred Whitehead,24. Masterman (Braithwaite), “The Pictorial Principle in Language,” Proceedings of the Xlth
International Congress of Philosophy 14 (1953): 139; my emphasis; hereafter abbreviated “PP.”
25. See Masterman, “Man-Aided Computer Translation from English into French Using an
On-line System to Manipulate a Bi-lingual Conceptual Dictionary, or Thesaurus,” in Proceed-
ings of the 1967 Conference on Computational Linguistics, 23–25 Aug. 1967, p. 15. See also Wilks,
“Margaret Masterman,” p. 282.
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Chinese? It is not that Masterman thinks that the ancient writing system is
a collection of pictures or pictographs—an unfortunate caricature dissemi-
nated by early Christianmissionaries—but that the ideographic writing oper-
ates on combinatory logic, not propositional logic. The difference between
combinatory logic and propositional logic carries tremendous importance
for her. To investigate the logical forms in classical Chinese is to look for
the rules of combination of ideographic clues or visual hints, and this is con-
ceivable only when one ceases to think of ideographs in classical Chinese as
pictorial representations of objects or icons by resemblance (see “PP,”
p. 140).Masterman’s method ismotivated by her discovery of the ideographic
asymmetric sequence in classical Chinese where “logical connections aremade
by creating and by combining combinators,—and nearly all these combi-
nators, in their primary function as elements, have demonstrative (i.e. index-
ical) significance” (“PP,” p. 142).
Take a typical Chinese phrase with a string of adjectives followed by a
noun. She determines that the string of adjectives is not arranged haphaz-
ardly, for the rule that governs it—logical, not grammatical—consists of
an ordering of conceptual elements going from the more abstract to the
more concrete; from themore general to themore particular; from themore
universal to the more limited. This combinatory logic takes the form of an
ideographic asymmetric sequence such as, (a(b(c))), which she spells out
as follows: “the idea of c, limited, or qualified by the idea of b, the whole,
c-qualified-by-b, being further qualified by a,” and the sequence can be ex-
tended on and on. In mathematical terms, she terms it Ascriptive Combi-
nator or A-Combinator and concludes that “it is ordering elements in this
way which I call the pictorial principle in language; and it is an extremely
fundamental and pervasive principle in all languages” (“PP,” p. 143).
That is to say, the combinatory logic of ideographic writing is not confined
to classical Chinese that happens to embody it. The same logic can be extended
to a new understanding of English and other languages until the ideographic
principle is shown to operate in all languages. This universal principle, more
logically fundamental than the measure of alphabetical writing, is poised to
challenge themetaphysical foundationof the philosophyof language. Toclinch
the point, Masterman set out to work on a substantial philosophical treatise
with the title “Metaphysical and Ideographic Language” to be published in26. Although Masterman made an effort to study classical Chinese, she sought help mainly
from linguist M. A. K. Halliday (Michael Halliday) and followed the work of sinologist Gustav
Haloun and Y. R. Chao. On Halliday’s role in CLRU, see Wilks, “Margaret Masterman,” p. 280.
440 Lydia H. Liu / Wittgenstein in the MachineBritish Philosophy in the Mid-Century (1957).27 At the same time, she began to
subject the combinatory logic of ideographic writing to the operational test
on the computer.
Before moving on to the computable thesaurus, we need to probe her
ideographic principle further. My discussion began with Masterman’s open-
ing question in “Words”: What is a word? Following upon her critique of
logocentrism in “The Pictorial Principle in Language,” a slightly different
question emerges: In what ways does her ideographic principle help illumi-
nate the philosophical conundrum of word-concept entanglement in lan-
guage? For instance, when the MT researcher is confronted by the undecid-
ability of the identity of ward, ward, ward, can she rely on the ideographic
principle and its combinatory logic to determine whether she is looking at
a single word with different meanings (polysemy) or whether these are mul-
tiple words that are somehow unified by a single written signWARD? In an-
ticipation ofMasterman’s surprising answer, we need to place the question on
slightly different footing to ascertain its relevance to the central concerns of
ordinary language philosophy raised first by Wittgenstein.
Word, Pattern, and Ideograph
Consider Wittgenstein’s discussion of the numeral in The Brown Book.
This is where he introduces a distinction between word and pattern before
casting doubt on it. Wittgenstein begins:
We may say that words and patterns have different kinds of functions.
When we make use of a pattern we compare something with it, e.g., a
chair with the picture of a chair. We did not compare a slab with the
word “slab”. In introducing the distinction, ‘word/pattern’, the idea was
not to set up a final logical duality. We have only singled out two charac-
teristic kinds of instruments from the variety of instruments in our lan-
guage. We shall call “one”, “two”, “three”, etc., words. If instead of these
signs we used “–”, “– –”, “– – –”, “– – – –”, we might call these patterns.
Suppose in a language the numerals were “one,” “one one,” “one one
one”, etc., should we call “one” a word or a pattern? The same element
may in one place be used as word and in another as pattern. [P, p. 84;
my emphasis]
A marvelous thought experiment, one that effectively challenges our precon-
ceived ideas about language. Still, Wittgenstein’s hypothetical numerals,27. This seventy-eight-page-long treatise deserves separate treatment that I will attempt in a
forthcoming book-length study. See Masterman, “Metaphysical and Ideographic Language,” in
British Philosophy in the Mid-Century: A Cambridge Symposium, ed. C. A. Mace (London,
1966), pp. 283–357.
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ness to accept the argument that one may in one place be used as word and
in another as pattern. The difficulty is how we can wrap our mind around
the possibility that a word written in alphabetical writing like one—as op-
posed to individual letters—could ever conceptually become a pattern or
nonword, although the reverse happens more plausibly as in the case of re-
bus. In my view, it is one thing to argue that the meaning of a word is its use
depending on the circumstance and quite another to suggest that a word can
become a nonword (if we suspend nonsense spelling and typographical ex-
periment for the time being), assuming that the distinction of word and pat-
tern will hold. Wittgenstein’s hypothetical numerals raise the possibility of
the ideographic determination of alphabetical writing, a scenario more rad-
ical than he would have imagined.
To elaborate, I offer a couple of additional observations. First, beyondwhat
Wittgenstein says about the ambiguity of word and pattern, there is the un-
decidability of the one and the many that troubles the second and third of
his hypothetical numerals. For instance, how can we determine whether
“one one” should be taken as two words/one pattern or two words/two pat-
terns expressing a single concept like that of Hindu-Arabic numeral 2? Con-
comitantly, are we supposed to take “one one one” as three words, one pat-
tern, or three patterns, all denoting a single concept as does numeral 3? It
seems that the problem of the one and the many refuses to go away. This pre-
dicament bears uponMasterman’s case ofward,ward,ward and the undecid-
ability of their word/pattern makeup.
That brings me to my second point. In his thought experiment, Wittgen-
stein proposes two types of hypothetical numerals: “one,” “one one,” “one
one one” versus “–,” “– –,” “– – –,” and so on, and he calls the horizonal bars
“patterns.” The pattern is construed as a nonword and negatively determines
the identity of word. Even if we preclude the thought of “final logical duality”
asWittgenstein rightly cautions us, we are still forced to determine the identity
of pattern by adhering to the metaphysical distinction of word and nonword.
Once we set on this path, is there a limit to which wemay extend the negative
reciprocal determination of word and pattern? Take Roman numerals I, II, III
where the alphabetical letter I is borrowed to form numerals. The numerals
cannot themselves be words in order for them to be simultaneously associ-
ated with English words one, two, three, French words un, deux, trois, or
Mandarin yi, er, san, or any other linguistic system. FollowingWittgenstein’s
argument, are we to call these numerals “patterns” formed with alphabetical
letters, not unlike his hypothetical “one,” “one one,” “one one one”? Alter-
natively, we might rewrite the same numbers as 一, 二, 三, or 〡,〢,〣 by
adopting one or another of established systems of Chinese numerals, the latter
442 Lydia H. Liu / Wittgenstein in the Machineset being ancient and obsolete. These numerals are likewise associated with
multiple linguistic systems across East Asia, such as Mandarin, Cantonese,
Min languages, Japanese, Korean, and others where the numerals cannot si-
multaneously be words. Are these patterns instead? Compared with Roman
numerals, the Chinese numerals bear closer visual resemblance to Witt-
genstein’s patterns “–,” “– –,” “– – –.” Can we conclude that they are more
pattern-like than I, II, III? On further reflection, the comparison between
the Roman numerals and the Hindu-Arabic ones (1, 2, 3) gives the impression
that the former is visually more pattern-like than the latter. What is a pattern
anyways? The impasse we are grappling with forces us to consider whether
visual criteria should be used—as seemingly implied in Wittgenstein’s ex-
ample—to adjudicate the metaphysical distinction of word and nonword.
Precisely to address such metaphysical predicaments, Masterman makes
a startling move in “Words” to initiate a series of inquiries into the ideo-
graphic determination of alphabetical writing. She does so by developing
an “exact analytical procedure” for philosophical analysis that would mark
a bold departure from Western metaphysics and the beginning of post-
Wittgensteinian philosophy. Central to her procedure is what she borrows
from classical Chinese called the zi 字 (tzu4 in her spelling; pronounced ji
by the Japanese as in emoji).28 For Masterman, the zi is what makes the
general and abstract category of the written sign possible, for not only does
the zi override the Wittgensteinian distinction of word and pattern, but it
also renders the distinction of word and nonword superfluous.
To demonstrate her new method, Masterman proposes a language game
in which the four-letter sequence ward is made to behave like a zi. The zi
ward—being a logical unit rather than a syntactic unit—momentarily sus-
pends the metaphysical question as to whether ward should be taken as a
single word with many meanings—that is, polysemy—or as several words
that happen to share the same letter sequence. Instead, she focuses on the
total spread of the zi to map out an indeterminate sequence that begins with
ward in isolation and becomes cumulatively determinate as complication
grows in context. The semantic spread of the zi does not coincide with what
we call word or words in English nor does it depend on grammatical units.
With a sufficiently long unit of discourse, some rules for distinguishing one28. The neologism emoji transcribes three kanji characters in Japanese or Chinese: 絵 (“pic-
ture”) 文字 (“written character”), the last 字 being pronounced zi in Mandarin and ji in Japa-
nese. Masterman relied on the Wade-Giles romanization scheme to write the same character as
tzu4. The collection from which I cite this work has introduced a typo tzu4 that I correct as
tzu4 here on the basis of Masterman’s original journal article. The superscript 4 in tzu4 denotes
the falling tone in Mandarin. I adopt the standard Pinyin romanization zi when referring to
her work while keeping her original spelling tzu4 in quoted texts.
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which is to say, one can make semantic distinctions without getting caught
up in the metaphysical entanglement of word and concept.
Masterman’s language game works thus: Instead of looking up the poly-
semic word ward in a dictionary, we are asked to consider the behavior of
the zi ward in the following sequence: “‘I ward thee a ward, Ward.WARD!-
Ward WARDward, Ward! Ward not to be warded, Acreward, in ward, I
ward thee, WARD! WARD! WARD! I ward thee, WA-ARD!’” (“W,” p. 56).
This thought experiment borders on Joycean exuberance in polysemy, but
what she is really doing is repeating the zi ward eighteen times and use punc-
tuation, typography, and other ideographic marks to provide each occur-
rence with a context and a specific sense. The quoted discourse, being suf-
ficiently long and sufficiently complex, gives the speaker of English a rough
sense of how the speaker warns someone named Ward to defend himself by
parrying the other man’s blow with the ward of his sword and further warns
him that if he doesn’t do this, he (Ward) will find himself carried off to Acre
and there cast into a prison cell, and so on. Whichever direction in which
one may choose to interpret the meaning of each use of ward, there emerges
in her language game almost a vectorial principle governing the cumulative
determination of indeterminate units in ordinary language use. Each repe-
tition is a repetition with difference. What does the repetition with differ-
ence entail? Masterman replies: “The fact that formal logical games are
played with indeterminate units does not prevent specific rules from being
devised to govern the methods of combination of such units” such that “the
games can be so played that, as the sequence of units extends, the spread of
the sequence becomes more and more determinate; as complication in-
creases, indeterminacy grows less” (“W,” p. 35). This appears to support
the Wittgensteinian argument that the meanings of a word are never inde-
pendent of the contexts in which it is used.
One could object that there is nothing new about the determination of a
word’s meaning by context. Should we even bother about the ideographic
zi when we may rely on our intuition to comprehend all of this? The answer
lies not in our intuition but in the formalmechanism—the logicalmechanism
or algorithms—that can predict what we comprehend through our intuition
and, therefore, lead to a robust theory of how particular meanings emerge
from linguistic context. WhatMasterman has done is string together eighteen
different occurrences and uses of the zi ward and punctuate the string by in-
serting stress marks, capital letters, a suffix (-ed ), as well as a few connecting
phrases. More importantly, she adopts what is called logical “bracketing” to
join verbal units inWardward or bring severalwards together, with a comma,
an exclamation mark, or a period or to bind three wards together by
444 Lydia H. Liu / Wittgenstein in the Machineincreasing the stress (“W,” p. 36). In lieu of syntactical units, Masterman
speaks of small words or other devices that are used as operators to define
the interrelations of these brackets. To render the interrelations of the brack-
ets fully legible, she transcribes the eighteen-ward language game in a coded
asymmetric sequence thus:
[[[/ ((({W}(W))W)F) / ((W)E) / (((W(WW)W))E) ///]
( ((W((NW)P)) ((AW)IW)) ((({W})W)E)) /// ]
/ ((W)E) / ((W)W) / ((({W})W)E) ///]
[“W,” p. 36]
Here she introduces a distinction between the conventions for the ideographic
zi as formulated in table 1 and the conventions for what she calls “phrases and
phrasing” (to distinguish her logical unit from the syntactic unit) in table 2
(fig. 1). The tables explain the ideographic symbols Masterman uses to eluci-
date the interrelations of the brackets in the logical formulation and its eigh-
teen reiterations of the zi ward. “In so far as we have adopted as logically
fundamental that analytic technique that consists in comparing, in context,
slightly differing usages and uses of the same word,”writes she, “just so far we
have already committed ourselves, though we may not know it, to a technique
that works in terms of tzu4, not in terms of words.” (“W,” p. 31; my emphasis).
Clearly, the ideographic asymmetric sequence ofward is muchmore than a
thought experiment with polysemy, because the “technique” she introduces
contains the seeds of radical philosophical movement between alphabetical
writing and ideography. This is what I meant when I said that the overcoming
of Western logocentrism did not mean the same thing for her as it did for
Derrida, as I am fully convinced that Masterman is the first modern philoso-
pher to push the critique of Western metaphysics beyond what is possible by
the measure of alphabetical writing, and, unlike deconstruction, her trans-
lingual philosophical innovation refuses to stay within the bounds of self-
critique.
Driven by a shared ideographic script associated with multiple languages
across East Asia, Masterman determines that the semantic spread of the dis-
crete zi vastly exceeds any known relations of word and concept in alphabetical
writing, because the zi is the site wheremultiple languages (andnumerals) con-
verge and crisscross or “interlingual both in space and time, that is denoted by
a single ideographic ‘character’, that is, by a visual shape, or graph” (“W,”
p. 28). To imagine a graph in English that approximates the semantic spread
of the zi is to ask a word like ward to stop being itself and become manifold
under the sign of its own written form as a generalized zi, more abstract and
universal than logos itself. This is the philosophical task she seeks to accom-
plish. By extending the ideographic principle of the zi to other languages
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ing beyond Wittgenstein’s speculation on word, pattern, and picture.
What does this move signify? I would say that it signifies a fundamental
repudiation of the unity of word and concept or that of icon and concept. Of
course, neither Masterman nor Wittgenstein was the first to critique these
unities. Gottlob Frege, among others, had rejected any attempt to equateF I G U R E 1 . Tables from Masterman, “Words,” p. 37.
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concept fulfills the grammatical function of the predicate more or less com-
mensurate with its mathematical function, and it shows up in the (unsatu-
rated) position of the predicate but never in the position of a grammatical
object.29 The distinction he maintains between object and concept is helpful
for the purpose of symbolic logic, but the logical statement is precisely where
Masterman begins her departure from the formalism of logicians who “tend
to regard ‘thought’ as themanipulation of logical units” and whose symbolic
manipulation is so strictly circumscribed that it leaves the actual language
data or usage unexamined (“PP,” p. 139).
It is a mistake to conclude, nonetheless, that Masterman’s critique of log-
ical statement is a rejection of logic or logical reasoning. Far from it, she ex-
presses a keen interest in developing an ideographic principle of language
whose combinatory logic prioritizes the logical unit of language over the
syntactic unit (see “PP,” pp. 140–41). She further claims: “It can be shown
that if we once adopt as our logical unit the logical conception of a tzu4,
for instance, rather than that of a word, we take a step that has fundamental
logical effects” (“W,” p. 31). With the zi taking precedence over word, her
methodological foray leads to the next step of approaching English writing
as an ideographic system, not unlike what Claude Shannon did when he in-
troduced “space” as the twenty-seventh letter of Printed English in informa-
tion theory.30
In “Words,”Masterman finds herself engaging extensively with the work
of Yuen Ren Chao, an esteemed linguist based at the University of California,
Berkeley and onetime president of the Linguistic Society of America.31 Chao
was the first to identify the conceptual gap between the zi and the “word,”
one that poses “the identity-of-unit problem: What constitutes one and the
same word?”32 He had long grappled with the widespread confusion sur-
rounding the semantic unit of the Chinese language whenever the category
of word is applied in linguistic and lexicological studies. Chao decided to29. Frege did most of this work in three influential essays “Function and Concept,” “On
Sense and Reference,” and “On Concept and Object”; see Gottlob Frege, Translations from the
Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, trans. P. T. Geach et al., ed. Geach and Max Black (To-
towa, N.J., 1980).
30. For my discussion of Shannon’s invention of ideographic English for information sys-
tems, see Lydia H. Liu, “The Invention of Printed English,” The Freudian Robot: Digital Media
and the Future of the Unconscious (Chicago, 2010), pp. 39–98.
31. Chao had taught at Tsinghua University in Beijing. Among his better-known maverick
feats was the first Chinese translation of Lewis Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland (1922) and his sup-
port of I. A. Richards’s promotion of BASIC English in China before WWII.
32. Yuen Ren Chao, “The Logical Structure of Chinese Words,” Language 22 (Jan.–
Mar. 1946): 4.
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ysis in his 1946 essay titled “The Logical Structure of Chinese Words” where
he points out that the zi articulates the logical structure of Chinese “words”
or “free form.”33 The fraught relationship between the written character and
its multiple linguistic counterparts is borne out by the phenomenon of mu-
tually incomprehensible pronunciations of the same character across many
languages in East Asia.34 This diversity and overwhelming tension is exacer-
bated by millennia-long morphological changes and linguistic borrowings
that result in increased homophones and synonyms in a writing system
shared by diverse languages. Prior to the introduction of English grammar
and grammatical texts from Europe, the zi had dominated all conceptions
of language in China and East Asia to the extent there was no word for word
nor was it deemed necessary to invent one until the early twentieth century.35
Chao’s insight led Masterman to question the grammatical word as a lin-
guistic fact. “Speaking grammatically,” she writes, “it is an understatement to
say that it is not clear what a grammatical word is. What is clear is that Chao’s
distinction between a ‘free form’ and a tzu4 [zi] is logically fundamental”
(“W,” p. 31). In lieu of logos, a written character corresponds to as many se-
mantic and/or phonetic units (some of which coincide with what we call
words) as there are languages and dialects. The zi, therefore, epitomizes the
problem of the one and the many between (one) writing and (many) lan-
guages that constantly calls for contextual determination of meanings.36
How unique is the situation of the zi? Is it not true that all communicative
acts require contextual determination, regardless of languages and writing
systems? Yes and no. It depends on what we mean by context. In her reading
of Chao, Masterman states that “we ourselves have tzu4 [zi], or general root
words, in English; ward is one. With a little trouble, we could compile a glos-
sary of the most fundamental English tzu4, and we could then invent ideo-
graphic signs for them” (“W,” p. 28). The bold translingual move she pro-
poses seeks to overcome the philosophical gap between the zi and the
“general root word” in English. “It is extremely difficult to exemplify this
process in English,” she says, “since we have become accustomed to think33. Ibid.
34. See ibid., p. 10. The same holds for the writing systems in Japan, Korea, Vietnam (be-
fore 1911), and other systems where the ideographic script (kanji in Japanese) has been adopted
or partially adopted.
35. The first Chinese grammarianMa Jianzhong translated the English term word as zi in 1898,
which caused confusion and contentious debates among Chinese linguists. Subsequently, word
was retranslated as ci (a super-sign) to help negotiate the gap between the zi and the ci (word).
For detailed discussion, see Liu, “The Sovereign Subject of Grammar,” The Clash of Empires: The
Invention of China in Modern World Making (Cambridge, Mass., 2004), pp. 181–209.
36. See Chao, “The Logical Structure of Chinese Words,” pp. 10–11.
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it mean to imagine English words as the zi, using the ideographic technique?
It means that, in place of metaphysical distinctions, the zi enables se-
mantic phrasings, clusters, and classes on the basis of combinatory logic.
As a generalized, abstract category of inscription, the zi is capable of sub-
suming different classes of signs, such as the shuzi (numerical zi) and the
wenzi (textual zi). The shuzi encompasses a multiplicity of indigenous and
imported numerical systems such as一,二,三;〡,〢,〣, or 1, 2, 3, irrespective
of patterns, words, or symbols. The wenzi, on the other hand, consists of
characters used in composing texts, although the written character—called
the syllabic morpheme by linguists—is not a word unit by any measure.
Thus, Masterman translates the abstract, universal principle into a set of
sophisticated computational techniques to guide the work of the CLRU
where she and her team developed a computable thesaurus and an interlingua
for machine translation.37 She declares: “On all sides, fascinating logical
vistas open out before me. I stand, like Alice, above a chessboard which
covers the whole world” (“W,” p. 37).
Masterman’s chessboard is no ordinary chessboard. Overlaid with allu-
sions and extended metaphors, it is associated, on the one hand, with Witt-
genstein’s analogy of words as chess pieces and, on the other, with the com-
puter programs that she and her team would construct at CLRU. Within a
decade or so, her machine would leave the analogy of words and chess pieces
behind to develop automated information retrieval, machine translation, and
other computational programs to be associated with machine learning.Computable Thesaurus
Imagine the Wittgensteinian language game being played on a corpus as
enormous as Roget’s Thesaurus or the entirety of English vocabulary, and
you get the idea of what it takes for Masterman to construct a machine
capable of handling the fraught relationship of word and concept in hu-
man languages. Will her post-Wittgensteinian machine live up to the am-
biguity and multiplicity of word meanings, cross-references, analogies, and
metaphors in language uses?
In what follows, I undertake a close analysis of Masterman’s elaboration
of the technique that “works in terms of tzu4, not in terms of words” as she
attempts to achieve her philosophical goals in the machine. Up till now, I37. Research at CLRU took off officially when the group received major grants from the
National Science Foundation totaling 101,250 dollars between 29 March 1957 and 6 May 1960;
see Automatic Language Processing Advisory Committee (ALPAC), Languages and Machines:
Computers In translation and Linguistics (Washington, D.C., 1966), p. 107.
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been able to take up her specific innovations in MT and IR. The truth is that
these two aspects of her work—philosophical and computational—are inex-
tricably interwoven and should be examined together. One cannot speak
about her innovation of mechanical thesaurus and semantic networks with-
out taking into account her critique of logical calculus associated with
Bertrand Russell and mainstream analytical philosophy. Although the story
of her pioneering role in NLP is well known to AI practitioners, the news
of her philosophical breakthrough has not arrived despite the fact that her
avowed goal was to achieve greater philosophical clarity on the question of
language, a promise she amply fulfilled by doing philosophy in the machine.
What does this doing entail?Wewill have a glimpse of it by examining theme-
chanical (computable) thesaurus that she designed with her team at CLRU.38
The thesaurus method—worked out philosophically through her explicit en-
gagement with Wittgenstein’s later work—anticipated word-sense disambig-
uation (WSD) and vector-space semantics in the AI research of our time.
Commenting on the computational study of “word-sense disambiguation,”
Gavin has credited its recent success to vector-space semantics, a popular
method in NLP that works by finding clusters in the semantic space of a word
and measuring how closely any individual use of the word sits near each clus-
ter. He shows that vector-space semantics is “a theory of ambiguity, pushing
strongly against the impulse to draw clear boundaries that isolate words into
discrete concepts.”39 Tracing the evolution of this method, Gavin shows that
Masterman and her teamdeveloped the first computer-based thesaurus drawn
fromRoget’swhen theymodeledwordmeanings not in terms of word-concept
correspondence but on distributed processes across a corpus in lattice-shaped
network in the 1950s.40 I agree with this assessment but must add that Mas-
terman’s computable thesaurus, in particular, is the undisputed forerunner
of word-sense disambiguation, even though some of the breakthroughs had
to wait till the 1990s when latecomers such as David Yarowsky tapped into
Roget’s Thesaurus again to develop sophisticated algorithms for unsupervised
machine learning on faster and more powerful computers.
The system of classification in Roget’s Thesaurus has some distinct advan-
tages for the computing machine over the OED that privileges etymologies38. CLRU relied on mechanical means of drawing up paper lists and using punched card ap-
paratus to process the lists. Their mechanical thesaurus consists of programs or semantic algo-
rithms that are computable and, therefore, may be called a computable thesaurus avant la lettre.
39. Gavin, “Vector Semantics,” p. 659. Known as distribution hypothesis in NLP, it helps
determine morphological segmentation.
40. See ibid., p. 653.
450 Lydia H. Liu / Wittgenstein in the Machineand definitions. The thesaurus identifies patterns and linkages among words
and phrases and employs a numerical system to assign the proximate location
of each use in relation to other locations.41Wilks recallsMasterman stating that
“thesauri like Roget were not just fallible human constructs but real resources
with some mathematical structure that was also a guide to the structures which
humans process language. She would often refer to ‘Roget’s unconscious’ by
which she meant that the patterns of cross-references, from word to word across
the thesaurus, had generalisations and patterns underlying them.”42 AI scien-
tists today would be inclined to translate her term “Roget’s unconscious” into
neural networks.
If theOED is philological and linguistic, the thesaurus is philosophical and
mathematical where the meaning of a word is not defined by other words so
much as determined by what surrounds its use or by the location where the
word occurs (its context) with a certain pattern or regularity. The MT pro-
grammodeled on the thesaurus must be able to “face and not evade the prob-
lem of the indefinite extensibility of wordmeaning,” observesMasterman.43 It
also means embracing and not eliding the ubiquity of metaphors, analogy,
poetry, and the language games with which Wittgenstein tried to grasp
the workings of ordinary language. For instance, Masterman had experi-
mented with a computer program written in the TRAC language to produce
machine-generated Japanese haiku poetry in 1968 (see “S”).44 The novelty of
a thesaurus as a model lies in its potential for analyzing the indefinite exten-
sibility of word meaning as a philosophical problem, and “it ties up my
translation model not to philosophy in general, but to a particular kind of
contemporary philosophy, namely, linguistic philosophy, the ‘philosophy
of ordinary language’” (“T,” p. 187).
Wittgenstein is known for his use of the duck/rabbit drawing to illustrate
how two mutually exclusive meanings arise out of a single icon. A related but
more powerful illustration is his analysis of the multiple aspects of the icon
that can be read “as a triangular hole, as a solid, as a geometrical drawing; as
standing on its base, as hanging from its apex; as amountain, as a wedge, as an
arrow or pointer, as an overturned object, which is meant . . . to stand on the
shorter side of the right angle, as a half parallelogram, and as various other41. See Masterman, “What Is a Thesaurus?” in Language, Cohesion and Form, pp. 134–38.
42. Wilks, “Editor’s Introduction,” in Language, Cohesion and Form, p. 7; my emphasis.
43. Masterman, “Translation,” in Language, Cohesion and Form, p. 187; hereafter abbreviated
“T.”
44. For her machine-generated haiku, see Robin McKinnon Wood and Masterman, “Com-
puter Poetry from CLRU,” in Cybernetic Serendipity: The Computer and the Arts, ed. Jasia
Reichardt (New York, 1968), p. 55.
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what we observe in the icon itself does not always correspond to a single con-
cept. The visual image refers to a set of family resemblances thatmay over-
lap but do not necessarily coincide with one another, and the same thing
happens to the linguistic abstraction triangle. If this insight appears to reso-
nate with Masterman’s analysis of the word ward, it is because she never
ceases to engage with Wittgenstein. The diagram represents one of her at-
tempts to formalize Wittgenstein’s discussion of the icon in her philoso-
phy machine (fig. 2).
In dialogue with Wittgenstein, Masterman’s diagram enacts the shape of
which it speaks by placing the visual sign at the apex to map out a trian-
gular network of family resemblances amongst the multiple uses (meanings)
of smaller icons that run parallel along the base. The big icon at the apex of
the diagram can be taken as a visual equivalent of the “head” in the comput-
able thesaurus.46 The diagram forms an icon—which Masterman terms a
“fan”—of the iconic relations in a network of family resemblances it seeks
to demonstrate.47
To visualize Wittgenstein’s philosophical argument about a particular
icon is not the same thing as to demonstrate how a network of family re-
semblances—iconic or otherwise—operates on the basis of the ideographic/
mathematical principle. W. J. T. Mitchell has interpreted the Peircean icon
in similarly ideographic terms: “At the heart of logic and mathematics,
then, the iconic relations of identity and equivalence, similitude and differ-
ence, are lurking.”48 Consistently visual and spatial, Masterman’s semantic
patterns derive from a finite set of semantic primitives or “sticking figures”
she had adapted from I. A. Richards and Molly Gibson’s Language Through
Pictures book series (see “T,” pp. 171–73).49 She presents them as iconic fig-
ures known as fans, semantic shells, lattices, and semantic squares in the
computable thesaurus. “In order to get semantic patterns on to a ma-
chine,” says she, “we have created in CLRU a unit of semantic pattern
called a template” and so on, a project that others like Sowa and Yarovsky
would pursue and advance decades later (“S,” p. 261). As she explores the
networks of overlapping and criss-crossing word meanings or semantic45. Wittgenstein, “Philosophy of Psychology—A Fragment,” Philosophical Investigations, p. 210e.
46. For her comparison of the thesaurus approach to language uses and Wittgenstein’s
gestalt-theory of concept, see Masterman, “Fans and Heads,” in Language, Cohesion and Form,
pp. 39–53.
47. See ibid.
48. W. J. T. Mitchell, Image Science: Iconology, Visual Culture, and Media Aesthetics (Chicago,
2015), p. 29. There is evidence that Masterman read Peirce, but she rarely refers to semiotics.
49. The series was created in 1952–1958 to promote the teaching of Basic English. Their
technique consists in portraying basic situations in real life similar to that used in comic strips.
452 Lydia H. Liu / Wittgenstein in the Machinepatterns along the Wittgensteinian line of inquiry, Masterman transforms
the thesaurus into a philosophy machine (see “T,” p. 195).
What her philosophy machine does is condense the whole of Roget’s The-
saurus from one thousand semantic categories to eight hundred—which she
calls “heads”—and have them card punched laboriously for experiments on
Hollerith sorting machines.50 This forms the basis of many of the computa-
tional innovations at CLRU, including the work of Spärck Jones. The latter’s
doctoral thesis on Synonymy and Semantic Classification completed in 1964
pioneered the computational studies in information retrieval, and her influ-
ential paper on inverse document frequency established the basis for search
engines that would be adopted by Google.51 These outcomes can be traced to
the initial decision at CLRU to use the thesaurus method, as Spärck Jones
explains:
The CLRU addressed the problem of lexical disambiguation, and advo-
cated the use of a thesaurus as a means of characterizing word mean-
ings, in part because the structure of a thesaurus naturally supports
procedures for determining the senses of words or, complementarily,F I G U R E 2 . The diagram to visualize the multiple contexts (meanings) of Wittgenstein’s
icon in Masterman, “Fans and Heads,” p.45, reproduced by Tal Unreich.50. See Wilks, “Editor’s Introduction,” p. 7.
51. See Karen Spärck Jones, “A Statistical Interpretation of Term Specificity and Its Applica-
tion in Retrieval,” Journal of Documentation 28 (Mar. 1972): 11–21.
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repetitive to be comprehensible so, in the simplest case in disambigua-
tion, if a word’s senses are characterized by several thesaurus classes, or
heads, the relevant one will be selected because it is repeated in the list
for some other text word. In text production, the fact that two heads
share a word suggests that this is the right one.52
The distinction between “head” and “word” lies at the heart of the comput-
able thesaurus. And what does that distinction signify? Spärck Jones refrains
from putting her explanation in philosophical terms, whereas with Master-
man—for whom everything must be worked out philosophically—the dis-
tinction of head and word is, first and foremost, a philosophical distinction
between ideograph and logos. The computable thesaurus must rely on the
head or the ideographic principle of the zi to embody many instances of
family resemblances and semantic patterns in text production and speech
contexts. The diagram above identifies the locations of head, word, and con-
cept in a mathematical modeling of their relations (fig. 3). The head is the
total set of word uses whereas the concept is the overlap of meanings (se-
mantic aggregate) of the total set of word uses in the head. Masterman treats
the head as ideographic sign, and equally important is the requirement that
the basic units of calculation in the computable thesaurus be heads, not words.
This is because we are dealing with a thesaurus system that classifies
words as a set of contexts rather than verbal synonyms. Each context is takenF I G U R E 3 . The mathematical modeling of the head as an interpreted lattice, from
Masterman, “Translation,” p. 210.52. Spärck Jones, commentary to Masterman, “Agricola in curvo terram dimovit aratro,” in
Language, Cohesion and Form, p. 159.
454 Lydia H. Liu / Wittgenstein in the Machineto be a single use of a word; as the sets of contexts can be infinite, there is
indefinite extensibility of word meanings. The infinite sets of contexts are
mapped onto a finite set of “heads” or eight hundred as adopted by CLRU.
The context or word use in each of the heads falls into “lists” or “rows,”
where the “list” is a set of mutually exclusive contexts; the “row,” on the
other hand, is a set of quasi-synonymous contexts that can be used one
after the other in an infinite string.53 These elements are tagged in the nu-
merical cross-reference system trackable by the computer. Take “839 LAM-
ENTATION,” where the numerical cross-references are interpreted as the




lament, wail, 363 INTERMENT;
languishment, grief, moan, condolence, 915
CONDOLENCE;
sobbing, crying, tears, mourning, 837
DEJECTION;
one be sob, sigh, groan, moan;
complaint, plaint, grumble, murmur, grief,
923 WRONG;
mutter, whine, whimper, 886
CIVILITY;
bang kind flood of tears, burst of tears, fit of tears;
crying, howling, screaming, yelling,
411 CRY;
one bang be spasm of sobbing, outburst of grief;
cry, scream, howl, 411 CRY;
wailing and gnashing of teeth, 900
RESENTMENT;
thing weeds, crepe, crape, deep mourning,
sackcloth and ashes, 225 INVESTMENT;
passing-bell, knell, keen, death-song,
dirge, 402 SOUND;
requiem, wake, funeral, 998 RITE;
[ . . . ]
[“T,” p. 204]53. See Masterman, “What Is a Thesaurus?” pp. 107–45.
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and repetitions that I cannot reproduce here. It is important to know that
the ideographic head is indicated by capitalized letters—LAMENTATION,
INTERMENT, CONDOLENCE, and so on—and each head is assigned a
number to cross-reference with other heads like 839, 363, 915, 837, and so
on. The ideograph is tagged and numbered in the series to classify a situation
or action associated with other series of cross-referenced terms. The capital-
ized ideographic head LAMENTATION is distinguished from the word
lamentation in the first row in the same manner as WARD is distinguished
from the word ward in Masterman’s extension of the zi principle to the En-
glish language.
To conclude, what does the machine modeling of the philosophical dis-
tinction between ideograph and logos accomplish? The answer is that the
machine sets a contextually-based analysis of semantic patterns in motion;
it means that the machine promises to measure up to the ambiguity and
multiplicity of word meanings, analogies, metaphors, human creativity, and
fallibility in language use; and it means that machine learning and AI technol-
ogies have been part of a major philosophical breakthrough even if their
practitioners remain unaware of it. In that sense, the computable thesaurus
is the philosophy machine Masterman and her team invented to bring the
post-Wittgensteinian philosophy of language into being.
